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ABSTRACT
The rules governing trade and capital flows have been at the center of controversy as globalization
has proceeded. One reason is the belief that trade and capital flows have massive effects on the labor
market  n either positive, per the claims of international financial institutions and free trade
enthusiasts, or negative, per the ubiquitous protestors at WTO, IMF, and World Bank meetings
demanding global labor standards. Comparing the claims made in this debate with the outcomes of
trade agreements, this paper finds that the debate has exaggerated the effects of trade on economies
and the labor market. Changes in trade policy have had modest impacts on labour market. Other
aspects of globalization  n immigration, capital flows, and technology transfer  n have greater
impacts, with volatile capital flows creating great risk for the well-being of workers. As for labor
standards, global standards do not threaten the comparative advantage of developing countries nor








  The trade war in my title does not refer to the current battles between the US and EU over 
GM-foods or bananas or steel or aircraft, but to the battle among economists, policy-makers, and 
activists over trade and globalization in the modern economic world.  Many economists and the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) responsible for the global economy argue that free trade 
and open capital markets are the key to economic success. Other economists, many NGO 
activists, and the ubiquitous protestors at WTO, IMF, and World Bank meetings believe that 
trade and globalization can destroy jobs and create poverty and inequality unless they are 
married to broader social objectives (See Deardorff, 2003). Since neither side advocates autarky, 
the argument is over the kind of globalization that would work best for the world: the orthodox 
brand, based on free trade and capital mobility (but not free immigration) embodied in the 
Washington Consensus (WC), with safeguards for capital and intellectual property versus a more 
structured or managed globalization, with safeguards for labour and the environment (but not 
free immigration).   
  The battle is largely empirical, albeit informed by relevant trade theory and models, and 
marked by passionate rhetoric that economists usually eschew. The passion reflects the one thing 
on which adherents and opponents of WC globalization agree – that trade and trade policies have 
a huge impact on economic outcomes and, in particular, on how workers fare in the labour 
market. 
2. Battles 
  Indicative of the importance that the two sides accord trade and globalization, consider 
the arguments over the following trade treaties: 
!  In the early 1990s, when the European Community removed intra-European   2
 barriers to trade, the US feared that an enhanced Common Market (EC 1992) would divert trade 
between the US and Europe, reducing American exports and jobs, while hoping that an EC-
driven expansion would increase demand for US goods and workers.  The key EU document on 
the single market, Cecchini (1988) predicted that EC 1992 would raise European GDP by 4-5% 
percent (midpoint of a range of estimates) while Baldwin (1989) estimated that permanent 
increases in growth would produce a present value gain of GDP of 11 to 35 percent.  In 2002 the 
EU Internal Market Commissioner declared that "The Single Market has transformed Europe 
beyond recognition in ten years. It has created millions of jobs and hundreds of billions of euros 
of extra prosperity. But the next decade will be no less crucial."
1 In fact, from 1992 to 2002 the 
EU performed less well than in the preceding decade, while the US had a remarkable boom in 
the late 1990s.
2  
!  In the late 1980s Canadians debated the Canadian-American Free Trade 
 Agreement.  Canada hoped that reduced tariffs would raise productivity and increase foreign 
direct investment and would secure access to the US market.  Prime minister Brian Mulroney 
promised “jobs, jobs, jobs” while his negotiators predicted pay increases for Canadian workers.  
Opposing the treaty, unions worried about businesses relocating to the United States in industries 
where economies of scale gave the US an edge and job losses in other sectors where Canadian 
plants were less productive than American plants. Canadian nationalists feared that increased 
economic integration would threaten Canadian culture and sovereignty. Almost immediately 
after signing the Treaty, Canada suffered its worst economic slide since the Great Depression.  
Most Canadian economists blame the 1990s slide on poor macro-economic policies, though 
                                                           
1Frits Bolkestein, http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/10years/index_en.htm 
2Deardorff, Alan and Robert Stern, “EU Expansion and EU Growth” “conclude that evidence for increased long run 
growth rates of the EU countries is weak”, introduction,  
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r487.pdf   3
some argue that the government’s free trade stance affected those policies.
3  In any case, other 
economic forces trumped whatever positive effects the trade agreement had on Canada.
4 
!  The struggle in the US over NAFTA in 1992-1994 pitted the Clinton 
 Administration and business community against the AFL-CIO and diverse other groups, with 
Ross Perot playing a critical role.  At the heart of the debate was how the treaty would affect jobs 
and wages.  On the basis of forecasts of a huge trade surplus with Mexico, the Administration 
promised that NAFTA would create 200,000 jobs per year.
5  Perot claimed that the treaty was 
going to cost the US 4% of employment (the great sucking sound of jobs moving to Mexico) and 
encourage illegal immigration.
6  Economists focused more on potential wage effects.  Bhagwati 
argued that the treaty would not affect wages on the grounds that trade was uncorrelated with 
relative prices.
7 Borjas, Katz, and  Freeman’s (1997) factor content analysis estimated that trade 
had small adverse effects on the wages of low skill workers.  The Administration and the 
business press warned that if the Congress were to reject the Treaty, the Mexican economy 
would collapse (See Lee, 1995).  Shortly after Congress passed the Treaty, the Mexican 
economy collapsed.  Following the 1994 peso crisis, the US trade surplus with Mexico fell, 
which by the calculations used in the debate, would have cost the US 700,000 jobs.  But no one 
complained.  The late 1990s boom trumped whatever effects NAFTA had on employment. (See 
                                                           
3http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_ecnmy/mera/engdoc/02f.html 
4 While the benefits of NAFTA for Canada have not been well documented, the Ipsos -Reid June 2003 opinion poll 
shows that 70% of Canadians support Canada’s involvement with NAFTA and believe the growing together of the 
Canadian and US economies is good.  Half of Canadians believe the Treaty has benefitted Canada, while a quarter 
think it hurt Canada. http://www.ipsos_reid.com/media/dsp_displaypr_cdn.cfm?id_to_view=1839   
5 This is based on an estimate by Hufbauer and Schott of 170,000 jobs (rounded to 200,000) that also predicted 
increasing wages and employment in Mexico.  After the Mexican peso collapse, Hufbauer said “The lesson for me is 
to stay away from job forecasting”, as quoted in Lee, p 11. 
6At a conference, I noted that since most US workers were in non traded sectors and only a small number were in 
industries for which Mexico was a good competitor, these claims had to be wrong.  An industry spokesman took me 
aside and offered a sizeable sum of money to support research debunking the effect of trade on employment. 
7  If trade had no effect on relative prices, it presumably benefitted no one either.  But in fact trade does affect 
relative prices and benefits some at the expense of others.   4
Lee, 1995)
8 
!  In 1995-1998 battle raged over the OECD’s proposed multilateral agreement on 
 investment (MAI).  Multinational firms wanted protection against being treated differently than 
domestic firms, the ability to sue governments for losses from national environmental and other 
legislation, and binding international arbitration for disputes with countries.  Many economists 
favored the treaty in the hope that these provisions would increase the flow of foreign direct 
investment to LDCs.  Opponents alleged that the MAI would shift power from LDC 
governments to multinational corporations.  They coordinated campaigns against the treaty in 
more than half of OECD countries and numerous developing countries.  In 1998 the OECD 
scuttled the treaty when France backed out under pressure from French protestors.  Absent the 
MAI, from 1995 to 2001, foreign direct investment FDI to LDCs averaged 0.6% of  advanced 
country GDP compared to 0.2% in the preceding five years (See Dobson and Hufbauer, 2001). 
!  The late 1990s/early 2000s trade war focused on linking environmental and labor 
 standards with trade.  Demonstrators at world economic summits demanded labour and 
environmental standards clauses in trade agreements with enforcement by trade sanctions while 
most developing country governments feared that standards were protectionism in disguise – a 
plot to lock LDCs out of world markets.  Some NGOs demanded debt reduction for highly 
indebted countries, while their opponents raised issues of moral hazard with such policies.  
3. An Alternative View  
  At the heart of the trade wars is the belief that changes in trade arrangements have huge 
                                                           
8 Public opinion in the US has been generally favorable to NAFTA, though when given an option “haven’t heard 
enough to say” over half of one survey chose that response.   See P. Warf and S. Kull, ”Tepid Traders: US public 
attitudes on NAFTA and Free Trade Expansion”, http://www.bus.ualberta.ca/CIBS-
WCER/WCER/NAFTAwarf.pdf. Support for trade continued after 9/11, see 
http://www.southern.org/pubs/Post_9_11.pdf 
   5
impacts on economies and on labor markets and worker well-being. Adherents to WC style 
globalization believe that developing countries can only grow through exports and openness.   
They fear that LDC trade with advanced countries is so fragile that it must be protected from 
global labor standards.  Opponents believe that good labor standards are so fragile that they must 
be protected from a race to the bottom, in which bad standards drive out good standards. 
  While complete autarky or imposition of advanced country standards on LDCs would  
have huge effects on economies around the world, the actual policies around which debate has 
focused and observed changes in trade patterns have not come close to having their ballyhooed 
or feared effects on labor markets or on economies writ large.  Both the proponents and 
opponents of globalization WC style have exaggerated the importance of trade.   Instead of 
dominating economic outcomes, changes in trade policy and trade have had modest impacts on 
labour market and economic outcomes beyond trade flows. Other aspects of globalization – 
immigration, capital flows, and technology transfer  – have greater impacts on the labour market, 
with volatile capital flows creating great risk for the well-being of workers.  As for labour 
standards, global standards do not threaten the comparative advantage of developing countries 
nor do poor labour standards create a “race to the bottom”.  Globalization and standards are 
complementary rather than competing activities. 
  Trade – a modest factor in economic growth?  Mobility of capital – a threat to 
developing countries? Labour standards – complementary with globalization?   
  A decade or so ago, most trade economists, especially those associated with IFIs, would 
have dismissed claims like these as the blathering of some populist nut – or perhaps a labour 
economist who doesn’t know Heckscher from Ohlin or Samuelson-Stolper and who cannot spell   6
Rybicinski properly.
9  Today, the situation is different. The 1990s experience with globalization, 
recurrent financial crises, and the economic collapse of the 1990s poster country for 
globalization, Argentina, has shaken orthodox claims.  Dani Rodrik’s critiques of globalization, 
Jeffrey Sach’s criticism of IMF policies in the Asian financial crisis, and attacks on Bank and 
IMF policies from insiders such as Joseph Stiglitz and William Easterly have forced the 
adherents of globalization WC style on the defensive.  Defenders of the orthodoxy now proclaim 
the virtues of globalization more guardedly and wonder whether the advantages of free capital 
flows outweigh the disadvantages.  The Managing Director of the IMF accepts the notion that 
labour standards are a positive force in the global economy – at least in a seminar in Germany.
10 
4. Trade – A modest contributor to economic progress? 
  Studies of the impact of trade and trade policies on economies consist of:  postmortems 
on trade treaties; cross-country regressions that relate GDP, poverty, and income inequality to 
measures of trade or openness; and case studies of country experiences. 
Postmortems 
  Postmortems on trade treaties compare actual outcomes to the outcomes that  supporters 
or opponents of the treaties promised.  Because other economic factors change, postmortems 
must go beyond simple before/after comparisons to control for non-treaty related determinants of 
outcomes.  The harder it is to control for other factors, the more likely it is that the treaties are 
less powerful determinants of outcomes than proponents or opponents proclaimed.  One way to 
                                                           
9 In 1992, when I gave a talk at the annual World Bank research conference arguing that labor markets and labor 
market institutions were not the cause of developing country problems – surely a less controversial claim – Larry 
Summers imported three ILO economists “to protect me” from Bank economists. The three heavies were not needed 
since most Bank economists in fact agreed with the claim.  But had I said that trade was not important and that open 
capital markets did more harm than good, I would have needed Hulk Hogan and Andre the Giant to save me from 
enraged IFI economists.   
10 “We also need a corporate code of ethics that fosters sustainable value creation that takes into account 
shareholders, workers, and the environment,” Horst Köhler, “The Challenges of Globalization and the Role of the 
IMF” at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Economics and Management at Humboldt University Berlin, May   7
isolate the effect of a treaty is to compare outcomes in sectors/groups more/less impacted by the 
treaty, on the assumption that other factors treated the sectors similarly.  Trefler (2001)goes one 
step further in analysing the Canadian-US free trade treaty by contrasting changes in 4-digit 
Canadian industries that had great reductions in tariffs with changes in other industries, relative 
to a cyclically similar period prior to NAFTA – a difference in difference analysis.  He found 
that  the most impacted industries had substantial falls in sales and employment, with the loss of 
employment exceeding the loss of sales, producing an improvement in productivity.  He 
interpreted this as showing that the treaty had “very large transition costs” (p. 19)  but had long 
run gains in productivity, much from plant closure.  This fits the experience of the import-
substituting sector, but does not fit the entire economy.  Over the entire decade Canadian 
productivity did not improve, despite the rapid increase in imports and exports, so that the 
question exercising Canadians in 2002 was the continued productivity deficit versus the US.
11   
  Tybout and Erdom (2003) summarize work that uses micro-enterprise or firm data to 
examine the effects of five trade liberalizing experiences in LDCs: Brazil, 1991-1994; Mexico 
(1984-89); India (1991); Cote D’Ivoire (1985-87); Chile (1973-79).  Virtually all of the studies 
find that productivity rises in import-competing sectors, consistent with Trefler.  In some cases 
they attributed the increased productivity to the exit of less efficient importers, in other cases 
firms invested in capital or squeezed inefficiencies out of their production process.  But in no 
country was the liberalization episode followed by a noticeable change in the growth rate.  From 
the data on growth, you could  not identify that there had been a policy change.
12 
    After the passage of NAFTA, the US government moderated its claims about NAFTA to  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15, 2003  
11 http://www.dfait_maeci.gc.ca/nafta_alena/over_en.asp  provides a summary  
12 Andrews, Donald, ”Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change With an Unknown Change Point,” 
Econometrica, vol 61, no 4, July 1993, pp 821-856.   8
“a modest positive effect on U.S. net exports, income, investment and jobs supported by 
exports”, estimating that “ jobs associated with exports to Mexico between roughly 90,000 and 
160,000", with no assessment of job losses due to imports.   Opponents argued that the US had 
lost some 766,000 jobs due to worsened trade deficit with Mexico and Canada.(See Scott, 2001)  
Mexican critics of NAFTA suggested that the sizeable post-NAFTA shift of employment to the 
informal sector was due to the treaty
13 and blamed trade for some of Mexico’s increase in 
inequality.  In fact, micro studies have attributed some of the rise in earnings inequality in 
Mexico to trade (Feliciana (2001), Hanson (2003), Hanson and Harrison (1999)).  More broadly, 
increased trade is associated with rising inequality in earnings in many LDCs, particularly in 
Latin America (Robbins (1994), Green et al (2000), Robbins and Gindling (1999), Beyer et al, 
1999), though not in all such countries (Gonzaga, Filho, Terra, 2002)   – the opposite of what 
trade between advanced and less advanced countries should produce.  One plausible explanation 
is that skilled workers in LDCs are akin to less skilled workers in advanced countries (Robbins, 
Feenstra and Hanson).  The claim that trade increases the size of the informal sector, however, 
has not been validated.
14  
Regression studies 
  “Few economists would doubt the beneficial effects of trade, despite the adverse impact 
on some groups.  Yet the hard evidence supporting such gains from trade - either in a 
dynamic or static sense - is surprisingly thin.” (Feenstra, 2001) 
 
  Studies that relate economic performance to trade across countries find that diverse 
measures of openness are weakly and non-robustly related to growth (Levine and Renalt, 1992).  
                                                           
13Carlos Salas, “The impact of Nafta on wages and incomes in Mexico”. Economic Policy Institute, table 2-2 shows 
a drop in wage employment in urban areas from 74% in 1991 to 61% in 1998 
14Penelope Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik, “The Response of the Informal Sector to Trade Liberalization” NBER WP 
9443, Jan 2003, report that trade raised informal sector employment in Columbia, “but only for the period preceding 
a major labor market reform that increased the flexibility of the Colombian labor market” and rejected the notion 
that the rise in the informal sector in Brazil was due to trade liberalization   9
Using a panel design Harrison found that some measures of trade are related to growth but that 
others were not related.  Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) note flaws in several analyses that link 
trade policy measures of openness to growth, which suggests that positive results depend 
critically on specification and measurement. When researchers add measures of other country 
policies and institutions to regressions linking growth to openness, the coefficient on openness 
invariably weakens.  Particular measures (the Sachs-Warner openness variable, for instance) may 
give the desired result that trade increases growth in some regressions, but not in others, and 
other equally valid measures do not show the expected positive link in almost any case. Using 
three separate indicators and a dynamic panel framework Greenaway, Morgan and Wright 
(2002) find that liberalisation has a modest positive lagged effect on growth in developing 
countries.  By contrast, Yanikkaya (2003) finds that trade barriers are positively associated with 
growth, especially for developing countries. 
  Most disappointing is the failure of seemingly simple demonstrations that “globalizers”, 
defined as countries that reduce trade barriers and/or expand trade, have better growth records 
than other countries.  The definition of who is a globalizer varies from researcher to researcher 
(compare Rodrik,1999 with Dollar and Kraay, 2000) and even in the same paper from revision to 
revision (compare Dollar and Kraay, 2000 with Dollar and Kraay 2001), with correspondingly  
disparate findings.  Since  Dollar and Kray’s globalizers had higher tariff rates than non-
globalizers in the 1990s as well as in the 1980s  (Dollar and Kray, figure 2) and lower ratios of 
trade to GDP in both decades (figure 2), moreover, it is unclear how to interpret differences 
among the groups.
15  The statement that low tariffs and trade are bad for growth is as consistent 
with the data in the figures as the claim that reductions in tariffs and increases in growth are good 
                                                           
15  In the 1990s globalizers reduced the rate of tariffs more than the non-globalizers, and increased trade/GDP, but 
the non-globalizers also reduced tariffs, by a comparable percentage amount, while experiencing a drop in   10
for growth.
16  What is needed is a general equilibrium model of how the entry of China and India 
into the global economy.  In any case, the collapse of Argentina, a country on all lists of 
globalizers, devastates any simple comparisons.            
  Even if research found a strong relation between trade and growth, this would not prove 
that trade caused growth. Causality could easily run the other way.  Frankel and Romer’s (1999) 
innovative use of the geography of countries to instrument for the independent effect of trade 
represents an interesting effort to identify causality.  Successful or not (see Rodrik and 
Rodriguez for a criticism), however, this approach does little to inform the trade wars debate.  
This is because there is no reason to expect that policy-induced trade would affect growth in the 
same manner as geographically-induced trade.  Since Zambia cannot readily move to Europe 
(though its people can migrate), knowing that trade due to nearness to Luxembourg affects 
growth does not do much to help the case for WC globalization.  
Country cases 
  Bhagwati and Srinivisan (1999) have argued that we are more likely to uncover the 
effects of trade in country case studies than in econometric analysis.  Labor economists have 
long found virtue in case studies – if you can’t give me at least one real world example of 
whatever you claim (and preferably more) , I don’t care how sophisticated you make your model 
or statistics, I will be sceptical.  But there are many countries and many liberalizing cases that 
take place over different time periods.  Case studies may correctly capture something about 
Korea in the 1960s, when China and India were outside the global economy – but which has little 
relevance to, say, Cote D’Ivoire in the 1990s, when China and India are major exporters.  
Greenaway’s (1993) review of World Bank case studies of 36 liberalisation episodes from 1950-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trade/GDP.  
16 Since the relation between reductions in tariffs and increases in growth is not robust, I do not pursue these   11
1982 notes many other methodological problems with case analyses and directs attention at the 
danger that analysts devoted to the trade produces growth view of the world will see “liberalising 
foreign trade through rose-tinted glasses.”  Many things are usually changing in a country in 
addition to trade policies, so ascribing causality through a case approach requires great care, 
knowledge and judiciousness. 
  In any case, my reading of country cases is that they do not line up on one side or the 
other of the trade wars.  Granted that Hong Kong succeeded with openness policies; that 
Singapore did as well, although under much greater government control; that Korea grew 
through increased exports, though again with considerable government control and a national 
industrial policy, and that Taiwan benefited from openness.  But South Africa did just about 
everything the World Bank wanted it to do as part of its GEAR (Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution) program and failed to deliver either growth, employment or redistribution.  When 
I was with the South African Labour Commission, we wanted the central bank to devalue the 
rand to increase exports and growth.  If only the rand devalued, South Africa would enjoy rising 
employment.  In the 1990s, the rand lost over half its value relative to the dollar, but South 
Africa still failed to grow.  Argentina followed IMF dictates to such an extent that the Fund 
invited President Menem to be one of two main country speakers at its1998 Annual Meetings.  
He stated  “...we have worked side by side with the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), to achieve macro-economic stability, deepen structural 
reforms, and adopt policies aimed .. (at) the poorest members of society.”
17  In 1999 Argentina 
began its economic collapse.  Any study of the Argentine crisis is a  “a humbling experience for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interpretations.  
17  President Carlos Menem, Argentina, Oct 6, 1998 Annual Meeting, Board of Governors IMF IMF, Summary 
Proceedings, 1998, p. 10 (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/summary/53/)   12
policymakers, investors, academics.”
18 
Retreat of WC globalizers on trade 
  When I started preparing this lecture, I feared that many trade specialists would dismiss 
the claim that trade is not the critical driver of economic outcomes as either nuttier than a 
fruitcake or incendiary.  The babbling of the labour economist who cannot spell Rybicinski.   
Instead, I have found that many defenders of openness WC style now read the evidence much as 
I have, though they put a different spin on the empirical findings.  Their claims no longer focus 
on trade per se but on a host of good policies, of which openness is only one.  Consider the 
following two statements by economists deeply committed to the beneficial effects of trade: 
 “  institutional quality – defined as the rule of law, the effectiveness of the government and 
so on – is also an important determinant of cross-country variation ... it is .... difficult to separate 
the effects of openness and institutional quality” (“Lifting all boats: why openness helps curb 
poverty” Andrew Berg and Anne Krueger (2002). 
 
   “the available empirical evidence does not support this claim” (p 28)  (that lowering 
taiff barriers will raise growth) but also requires “... other policy changes aimed at eliminating 
large government deficits, curtailing monetary policy, maintaining market-oriented exchange 
rates, increasing competition among domestic firms, reducing government corruption, improving 
the education system, strengthening the legal system, and so forth”   (Robert Baldwin, 2003) 
 
  Theorists have moved from the evidence that institutional differences and other policies 
greatly affect outcomes to consider whether institutional differences may seriously impact 
whether trade is beneficial for an economy at all.  Krishna, Mukhopadhyay and Yavas (2002) 
argue that trade can have deleterious effects when factor markets are distorted whereas the same 
trade will contribute to growth in a non-distorted labor market.  The empirical issue is how much 
deviation from some competitive ideal is needed to turn the positive effects of trade into negative 
effects.  Hopefully, trade’s good effects are robust across many institutional arrangements, but 
there are no empirical studies regarding this point.  It is the “so on”s and “so forth’s” that seem to 
                                                           
18Ricardo Hausmann and Andres Velasco, The Argentine Collapse: Hard Money’s Soft Underbelly, April 26, 2002   13
have carried the day. 
5.  Immigration Has Larger Impacts On Labour Market 
  International financial agencies and trade economists think of globalization largely in 
terms of trade and capital flows, and leave immigration on some back burner.  There are several 
reasons for this.  Trade treaties are negotiated internationally by government agencies with no 
responsibility for immigration.  The IFIs deal exclusively with trade and capital issues.  Most 
countries have committed themselves to greater openness via trade or capital markets but want 
control over immigration – a position that seems to resonate well with their citizens, most of 
whom support globalization in trade but not in immigration.
19 Finally, there has been a division 
of labour in which labour economists use micro-data sets to study immigration while trade 
economists use firm/product and financial data to study trade and capital flows. 
  The statement that immigration has more important impacts on the labour market than 
trade is meaningless in some models.   In a standard Hecksher-Ohlin trade model, one cannot 
analyse  trade and factor flows independently.  Both are ways to equalize factor proportions, 
implicitly in the case of trade, explicitly in the case of immigration or capital flows.  Mundell 
(1957) treated immigration and trade as perfect substitutes.  If a country restricts immigration, 
this induces trade flows; if the country enacts tariffs, this induces immigration.  It is only by 
restricting trade, immigration, and capital flows that a country truly distances itself from the 
global economy.  In newer trade models that base trade on increasing returns or differences in 
technology across countries, immigration plays a larger and more distinct role.  Technology 
transfer through  persons trained in advanced countries to LDCs can greatly improve the well-
                                                           
19 A 2003 Pew Center poll found that the majority of citizens in most countries believed that “growing trade and 
business ties between (their country) and others was a good thing.  A substantial minority, however, believed that 
working conditions and the gap between rich and poor had worsened as a result of their country being more 
connected to the world through trade A majority wanted to restrict entry into their country more.   14
being of LDCs at some cost to the advanced country.  Immigration from LDCs to advanced 
countries that spreads advanced technology over more workers reduces the terms of trade of 
advanced countries, potentially costing them a lot (Davis and Weinstein, 2002).  But the flow of 
highly educated workers from LDCs to advanced countries can improve the well-being of 
advanced countries while removing the most able from LDCs.  
  In a factor proportions framework, the natural tool for comparing the effects of 
immigration and trade are factor content calculations, where one can measure the implicit impact 
of trade on factor proportions.  Analysis by Borjas, Katz, and myself (1992, 1997) found that 
immigration contributed more to changing US factor proportions in the 1980s and 1990s than did 
trade.  Unskilled immigrants, particularly from Mexico, increased the ratio of unskilled to skilled 
workers by some 20% whereas trade flows have increased the (implicit) ratio by about 4%.   In 
countries with a more balanced distribution of immigrants or with fewer immigrants, such as the 
UK, trade might turn out to be more important than immigration, though I am doubtful.   
  There are several reasons why trade has modest effects on a nation’s implicit factor 
proportions compared to immigration.  First and foremost, of course, is that much of trade is 
among advanced countries, who have similar factor proportions, while much immigration is from 
LDCs to advanced countries.  Second, the differences in skill mix across industries are not as 
stark as one might imagine.  In the US Borjas, Katz, and I (1997, table 4) estimated the skill mix 
associated with imports and exports by taking a weighted average of the skill distribution of 
industries, using the industries share of imports or exports as weights.  We found that 22.5% of 
employees associated with imports were high school dropouts compared to 17.0% of employees 
associated with export industries; whereas 15.9% of workers associated with imports were 
college graduates compared to 20.5% of workers associated with exports.  The difference in skill 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://people_press.org/reports/pdf/185topline.pdf , q 37. Q 24   15
mixes between import and export sectors is substantial but far from overwhelming.  Industries 
that export still hire a sizable number of unskilled workers, while industries that import hire a 
sizeable number of skilled workers.  Compared with this, immigrant flows are more disparate, at 
least in the US due to large numbers with less than high school education coming from Mexico 
and other LDCs.  
  Over time immigration has a larger effect on factor proportions than trade because 
immigrant flows cumulate to stocks, whereas trade is an annual flow.  A 1% immigrant flow for 
10 years produces an immigrant share of the work force of 10% (assuming no return migrants) 
whereas a trade flow that produces a 1% increase in implicit labour supply in a year produces 
that 1% increase in supply annually. Finally, whereas some goods have little or no domestic 
competition (think coffee) and non-traded goods and services have no foreign competition (think 
grocery stores), immigrants compete with native workers across the boards, in non-traded as well 
as in traded goods sectors. 
  The evidence that immigration has had bigger effects on skill proportions in labour 
markets than does trade does not mean, however, that immigration necessarily has large effects 
on wages.  Analyses of massive flows of immigration into particular geographic areas find at 
most modest reductions in the wages of workers for whom the immigrants are most likely to be 
substitutes.  Borjas, Katz and I (1996) entitled one of our efforts to find effects across geographic 
areas “Search for the Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market “ and came up, as had many 
other researchers, empty-handed.   The most striking evidence is Card’s (1990) study of the 
Mariel boat lift to Miami, which showed that this large unexpected migrant flow had virtually no 
effects on the market for low skilled workers in that city.   Seeking to explain the negligible 
impact of immigration across geographic areas, Borjas, Katz, and I (1997) noted that the huge   16
immigration to California was associated with a decline of internal migration to the state, which 
would act to disperse the effects of immigration across the US.   This view, while consistent with 
some other research (Filer, 1992), is not supported in other work (Card and DiNardo, 2000).  
Approaching the finding from a trade perspective, Gaston and Nelson (2000) interpret the small 
effects of immigration on wages as the result of responses of the distribution of industrial output  
to immigration that make factor-prices relatively insensitive to the immigrant flows.  Immigrants 
arrive and entrepreneurs set up businesses to use their skills.  That something of this sort operates 
can be seen in the rise of the apparel in Los Angeles and New York coincident with the flow of 
low skill immigrants.  But Borjas (2003) finds that when workers are divided by education and 
experience, longitudinal analyses of US Census data show that immigration has a sizable impact 
on the wages of native workers, with elasticities comparable to those in time series studies of the 
effect of labour supplies on relative wages.  
  In any case, my claim that immigration has a bigger effect on the labour market than 
trade depends not on the magnitude of the immigration effect, but on the fact that immigration 
changes national factor proportions more than trade.  Both could have modest effects on wages, 
with immigration having a larger impact than trade. 
  How immigration affects sending countries has received less empirical attention.  By 
reducing labour supply in the sending country, emigration should raise wages.  Consistent with 
this, Hanson (2003) finds that the most powerful variable affecting 1990-2000 changes in wages 
among states in Mexico was the state-US migration rate. This variable trumps state GDP growth, 
FDI share of sate GDP and import share of state GDP.   
6. Capital Mobility Is Dangerous 
  On May 27, 2003, a group of economists held a conference in Washington DC that asked   17
“Is Financial Globalization Harmful for Developing Countries?” The discussion paper at the 
meeting concluded that “it has proven difficult to find robust evidence in support of the 
proposition that financial integration helps developing countries to improve growth and to reduce 
macroeconomic volatility”and noted the risk and danger to countries in the early stages of 
financial integration of higher volatility of output and capital
20.  Who is this group?  Radical 
economists associated with anti-globalization protestors?  Trouble-makers from trade unions 
who can’t spell Rybicinsky?  Would you believe the International Monetary Fund?   
  The IMF has not recanted its previous views -- international organizations rarely admit 
being wrong  – but there has been a sea change in its thinking about global capital markets.  
Consider, for example, as the following two statements from the Fund’s Managing Directors. 
 
  “in an open market you will have massive capital flows, but the experience of the world, 
particularly during these last five or six years, is that these massive capital flows have been a 
positive development, helping developing countries in their very rapid expansion.” Managing 
Director Camdessus April 1997
21 
 
  “the globalization of financial markets has been accompanied by devastating financial 
crises in emerging market economies.  The causes of these crises are complex. However, a 
common feature has often been over-indebtedness and massive reversals in capital flows, 
leading to severe recession accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment.”  Managing Director 
Köhler  May,  2003.
22 
 
  In theory, global capital markets send capital from advanced countries to poor countries, 
raising the amount of capital per worker in those countries and their wages.
23  But in many 
LDCs, the flow of capital has not gone the expected way, and the major importer of foreign 
capital  has been the US, whose stability and technological progress has attracted foreign 
investment and allowed a huge trade deficit and that could permit an equally massive federal 
                                                           
20E. Prasad, K Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, M.A. Khose “Effects of Financial Integration on Developing Countries: 
Some Empirical Evidence,” IMF March 17, 2003 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.pdf/, p 10, p 
11. 
21http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1997/tr970428.htm 
22 Horst Köhler The Challenges of Globalization and the Role of the IMF Humboldt University Berlin, May 15, 
2003 http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/051503.htm 
23 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and  Olivier Jeanne  argue that the welfare gain from switching from financial autarky 
to perfect capital mobility is modest in a typical emerging economy, even without allowing for the risk that such   18
budget deficit.   Net foreign investment in LDCs has been modest, concentrated in a few 
countries.  Some major LDCs like China run huge balance of trade surpluses, which necessitate 
capital outflows. The wealthy in LDCs invest substantially in advanced countries as a safeguard 
against corrupt governments and insecure property rights or currency fluctuations.  On the order 
of 100 billion dollars of private Argentine capital, for instance, resides outside the country.   
  The claim that open capital markets create risk without delivering clear benefits is based 
on a growing body of empirical research on the link between financial liberalization and 
economic progress.  Diverse studies have found that financial liberalization increases the chance 
of a banking and currency crisis, which have substantial economic costs. The 1994 Mexican peso 
crisis, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, and the 2001 Argentine meltdown, being cases in point.  
Aizenman (2002) estimates that a currency crisis costs a country 8% of GDP and that a currency 
and banking crisis cost it 18% of GDP.  Nothing short of a civil war could have such impacts in a 
short period of time. 
  The failure to give LDCs protection against the risk of volatile capital flows is the major 
failure of the international capital market.  Instead of providing financial instruments for risk 
management (Shiller, 2003), the global capital markets place risk on the developing countries.  
Most LDCs cannot raise money in international capital markets in their own currency, even in 
the form of indexed bonds which would eliminate the risk to investors that the country would 
inflate its currency to avoid paying the debt.  One of the few exceptions was Mexico’s 
Tesobonos short term debt instruments, which the US treated differently than other debts in its 
financial rescue package for Mexico.   In crisis or in expectation of a financial crisis, the private 
capital market demands extraordinarily high interest rates to cover the risks to LDCs –  the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mobility will destabilize an economy. 
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opposite of an insurance system. Global capital markets create an “exit” option for domestic 
capitalists that could be harmful to economic development, since those capitalists may have 
country-specific knowledge as well as political voice to steer countries toward better economic 
policy that foreign capitalists may lack.  European countries recovered from World War II with 
capital controls that they did not remove until the 1960s or later, but global financial institutions 
have discouraged developing countries from controlling the flow of domestic or foreign capital.  
  On the other side, the gains of financial opening on growth are elusive in empirical work. 
In their review, IMF economists identified 14 studies of the relationship between financial 
opening and growth: only three studies found positive effects of financial liberalization on 
output.  The IMF also contrasted the growth rate of real GDP per capita against a measure of 
capital account openness for 1982-1997 and found no relation.
24 At the same time, FDI is 
associated both with domestic investment and growth, though it may simply be responding to 
good economic conditions in a country.  Even if financial integration positively impacted on 
growth, however, it is unclear that IMF loans or stabilization programs help countries access the 
global capital market.  Some studies like LI (2003) show that IMF programs do little to improve 
access; others note that the ability of programs to imrove access for countries depends on the 
conditions under which it makes the loan – commitment to reforms and other policies ... the so 
forth and so on.  
  In sum, under the current world financial architecture, international capital markets place 
normal citizens in poor countries at risk without assuring them of compensating benefits. And 
                                                           
24 Prasad, et al. Table 3 Figures 6 and 7. The IMF researchers contrasted financial integration of the fastest and 
slowest growing economies from 1980-2000.  Seven of the ten fastest growing economies were financially 
integrated compared to three of the ten slowest growing economies.  But this  differential is unlikely to persist in a 
multi-variate analysis that included a measure of governance or political stability The slowest growing countries 
included Haiti, Niger, Burundi, Venezuela, Togo, Peru, and Cote D’Ivoire as well as the more stable Jordan, South 
Africa, Ecuador, and Paraguay.  See Prasad, et al. table 2.   20
the global financial powers rarely consider schemes designed to improve risk management, be it 
a Tobin tax to reduce the volatility of capital
25 or an international bankruptcy court.
26 
7. Labour Standards Rise Under Globalization   
  There are two conflicting fears about the relation between trade and labour standards.  
Free trade advocates fear that standards are protectionism in disguise that would undermine LDC 
trade.  Advocates of standards fear that poor standards in some countries will undermine 
standards in other countries.  Both fears are wrong. 
  The global trading community regards the anti-sweatshop activists who seek global 
labour standards as naive or disingenuous protectionists:   
  “The talk of “exploitation”, failure to pay a “living wage” ... (is) little more than cynical 
manipulation of our moral instincts and an obfuscation of the reality to pursue our economic 
interest while creating the illusion that we are helping the victims instead.” (Bhagwati, 2000)  
 
   "The demand for linkage between trading rights and the observance of standards with 
respect to the environment and labour would seem to arise largely from protectionist 
motivation."   (Srinivasan, 1994, p 36) 
 
   "The real danger of using trade sanctions as an instrument for promoting basic rights is 
that the trade-standards link could become highjacked by protectionist interests attempting to 
preserve activities rendered uncompetitive by cheaper imports." (World Bank, World 
Development Report 1995, p 79). 
 
   "Western countries openly propose to eliminate the competitive edge of East Asia... 
professed concern about workers' welfare is motivated by selfish interest." (Mahathir bin 
Mohammed )  
   
  Elliott and Freeman (2003) examine the fear that campaigns to improve labor standards 
are protectionism in disguise and find it groundless.  The movement for global standards comes 
from consumers, students, and activists who are willing to pay more for items produced in LDCs 
                                                           
25 This is not to endorse a Tobin tax on transactions, which faces problems of implementation, but simply to remark 
on limited attention to any schemes to reduce volatility. 
26  Anne Krueger’s proposed bankruptcy court got nowhere in 2002, despite the Argentina crisis.  There was a 
similar lack of response to Jeffrey Sach’s 1995 proposal for such a court.   21
under good conditions,
27 not from firms or workers who produce items that compete with LDC 
goods. The activists make it clear that the worst thing for the firms they target to do would be to 
withdraw production from LDCs.  As for the unions in advanced countries who are often 
associated with anti-sweatshop groups, they know that jobs and sectors have shifted permanently 
to the LDCs.  Union workers are disproportionately employed in high skill export industries, not 
in low wage import industries.  Their economic interests lie in free trade not in protectionism.  
When they believe members can benefit from protectionism, they do not hide their intentions: 
they unabashedly seek protection from trade, as the US steel union did in 2001, when it struck a 
deal with the Bush administration.
28 
  Motivation aside,  improved standards in LDCs might still raise costs greatly in the 
formal sector and thus curtail the growth of employment and output.  In fact, firms can meet 
most standards at relatively low cost, with little impact on employment and growth and can 
potentially pass the costs on to consumers in advanced countries who want those standards.  
Providing decent treatment at work in the form of emergency exits or lights in a workplace or 
fire extinguishers or giving workers security from sexual or other harassment or the right to go to 
the toilet cannot cost much.  As for the standards that may cost the producer considerably, such 
as  Nike’ investing millions in making its Indonesian shoe factory safe from chemical fumes, 
even these numbers pale relative to the cost of the final price of the item, given the small share of 
cost of production in LDCs to those items.   
  Regression studies using cross-country data have found little or no link between measures 
                                                           
27 The willingness of consumers in advanced countries to pay more for products made under better conditions in 
LDCs means that higher standards can increase the flow of money to those countries.  If LDCs could organize 
around global standards, they could alter the terms of trade in their favor by jointly passing on to advanced countries 
the cost of higher standards through higher export prices.   
28One could argue that advocates motivated by protectionism could by chance produce a level of global standards 
that would improve the well-being of workers in LDCs, as an unintended consequence, but I doubt that even persons 
favorable to standards would accept such an argument.   22
of standards, usually indexed by the number of ILO conventions a country has signed, and labour 
costs, foreign direct investment (FDI) or related outcomes.  Although this conclusion fits my 
expectations, I put little weight on it, because the data are too aggregative and subject to 
measurement error to yield any firm conclusions.  The number or kind of ILO Conventions that a 
country has signed is at best weakly related to actual standards, so that weak correlations could 
simply reflect measurement error.
29  What is needed are careful company or plant level case 
studies using firm data on the actual costs of improving standards.  
Race to the bottom? 
  The notion that low standards in some countries leads to a race to the bottom in standards 
-- social  dumping – does not stand up to criticism.  The proposition assumes that standards raise 
costs of production sufficiently to impose a competitive disadvantage on producers with higher 
standards.  Initially, the argument was that bad standards in LDCs would drive out good 
standards in advanced countries, but given the different goods produced between advanced 
countries and LDCs, it is more plausible to worry that bad standards in some LDCs might drive 
out good standards in other LDCs.   
  The race to the bottom argument ignores the ways in which a country can maintain 
standards in the face of competition.  Part of the cost of standards will, after all, fall on workers, 
who prefer higher to lower standards.  A mandated increase in benefits shifts the supply of 
labour (making it more attractive for workers) and the demand for labour (raising costs), where 
the schedules are measured with respect to wages only.  The extent to which the cost falls on 
                                                           
29 Three of five studies relating measures of ratified ILO conventions find no relation (OECD, 1996; Kucera, 2002); 
Flanagan (2002).  Rodrik (1996) measured standards by the number of ratified ILO conventions and by US embassy 
reports on lax child labor standards and found that the number of conventions and superior child labor standards 
were associated with higher labor costs, but were not linked to exports and found that US FDI was greater in 
countries with better child labor standards.  Maskus (2003) found the labor standards were positively related to 
export performance in East Asia.  Flanagan interprets his result that “international labor standards do not influence 
labor costs, exports, and foreign direct investment" as indicating that standards are symbolic, but it could be that   23
employers or workers is an issue of incidence comparable to that of the incidence of taxes.  In 
addition, some standards that raise short term costs to firms may have greater benefits than costs 
for an economy over the long run.  Child labour laws, laws requiring children to attend school, 
and the like, increase human capital formation at the expense of higher costs of production for 
firms that employ children.  Some health and safety regulations, which reduce injuries and 
fatalities,  may also pay for themselves at the national level, although not at the firm level.  With 
flexible exchange rates, moreover, economies can adjust to different standards through changes 
in exchange rates.  If Brazil wants to spend more on occupational health and safety standards 
than China, and if some of the cost of those standards falls on firms, Brazilian firms will be at a 
competitive disadvantage at a given exchange rate.  But then the Brazilian currency will 
depreciate relative to the Chinese currency, and all Brazilians will bear the cost of the higher 
health and safety standards through the higher cost of imports.  Countries can choose the level of 
standards they want.  
  Conceptual arguments aside, the fact is that labour standards have risen with 
globalization.  Standards have risen in advanced countries in the post World War II period while  
trade has increased among those countries and between them and LDCs.  Economic problems 
have caused some standards like minimum wages to decline in some LDCs, but countries 
continue to sign up to ILO conventions, which commit them to improving standards.   Harrison 
and Scorse (2003) find that in Indonesia during the period of human rights activism there was a 
significant upward trend in compliance with minimum wage legislation among exporting 
industries, particularly in the garment and apparel sectors on which anti-sweatshop activists 
focussed their attention.
30 ILO Convention 182, against the worst forms of child labour, was 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their cost effects are too small to be captured in these types of regressions.  
30Ann Harrison and Jason Scorse “The Impact of Globalization on Compliance with Labor Standards: A Plant-Level   24
ratified by 74 countries in just two years.  In their analysis of the impact of liberalized trade 
policy on child labour, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2003) found that in Vietnam price increases in 
rice associated with the elimination of an embargo on exports reduced child labour in the 1990s, 
largely because families became wealthier.  
  Finally, the evidence that foreign-owned firms tend to pay higher wages and offer better 
working conditions than domestic firms or in agriculture, shows that globalization improves 
rather than reduces labour standards.
31  Because even bad working conditions in multinationals 
or their subsidiaries in export sectors are better than working in agriculture, the export sector has 
a continuous flow of labour applicants.   
8. Conclusion: The Cost of Exaggerated Claims 
  If one accepts my main theme – that the trade wars has exaggerated the impact of trade 
on economies –  two questions naturally arise – why? and does it matter?  Why have proponents 
and opponents of trade WC style exaggerated claims about the effects of trade? Have the 
exaggerated claims done any harm? 
  A “conspiracy interpretation” of the exaggeration by proponents of trade treaties and 
open markets is that their real intent is to increase the power of capital and reduce the scope for 
governments to redistribute income to lower wage workers. In this sense, they resemble recent 
tax cuts in the US: sold as something to spur the economy and create jobs, but designed largely 
to redistribute income from the middle class to the super-wealthy.   A similar “conspiracy 
interpretation” of the exaggerated costs of trade by opponents of trade treaties and open capital 
markets is that they are old-line leftists who oppose free markets and capitalism and use the 
globalization issue as a means for furthering their otherwise discredited views.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Study (Brookings Trade Forum, April 2003). 
31 Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern “The Effects of Multinational Production on Wages and   25
  A less cynical view is that political debate require analysts to exaggerate costs and 
benefits to attract the attention of the public.  If Ross Perot had campaigned against NAFTA by 
saying “it’s not going to be as good as the Administration says, and there will be some real 
costs”, he would not have won the attention that the great sucking sound gave him.  Similarly, if 
the Clinton Administration and supportive economists had said  “some will gain and some will 
lose, but the gainers will make more than the losers will lose (and might contribute to our 
political party) and neither the gains nor losses will be big enough to measure afterwards”, they 
might not have convinced Congress to enact the legislation.  Economists who engage in public 
debate must weigh the benefits of strongly supporting their side and getting attention against the 
costs of losing professional credibility.  Borjas, Katz, and I were happy to see our work on the 
effects of trade cited by both sides in the debate, but upset when the same work was attacked by 
both sides.   
  Another possible reason why economists oversold the advantages of export-oriented 
openness may be an intellectual rebound from the failure of import substitution strategies in the 
previous decade.  The successes of East Asia and later China and India as they entered the global 
economy raised the possibility that perhaps there was a single path toward economic growth, and 
that the WC had found it.    
  Did the hype about the benefits or costs of trade do the global economy any harm?  It 
gave the public, policy-makers, and researchers an unrealistic view of the role of trade in 
economic development and growth. It led some to see trade as the solution to problems, when at 
most it is a start to solutions. It led others to see trade as the star villain when in fact it is a bit 
player. But perhaps the public balanced out the two extreme views.  Despite the rhetoric around 
particular treaties and issues, people around the world seem to have come out reasonably 
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favorably inclined to globalization and favorably inclined to labour standards – which I find 
reassuring.     
  But there still was a cost to the exaggerated argument in the trade wars.  The cost is that 
debate focused on trade issues and adding labour standards to trade treaties rather than on the 
more problematic capital flows.  Protestors did not demand reforms in volatile capital markets 
and indebtedness with the vigor they opposed trade treaties that lacked labour standards clauses.  
Free traders did not trouble over the architecture of the global financial system as much as they 
did about the alleged risk of adding labour standards to trade treaties, though Bhagwati expressed 
grave concerns over open capital markets.   Neither side asked for freer flows of immigrants.  As 
a result little has been done to restructure world capital markets to reduce volatility and risk, and 
immigration policies are not part of the globalization debate.   With the retreat of the WC 
globalizers from their strong claims about trade and their recognition of the problems of open 
capital markets, hopefully the trade wars will transmute into the global capital market wars and 
the agricultural subsidy wars in the near future. Rybczynski.  
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